A New Era at St. Bonaventure: The Mike MacDonald Bet
- SBUnfurled
- 23 hours ago
- 8 min read

St. Bonaventure didn’t look far for its first new head coach in nearly two decades.
In a move that leans more toward long-term direction than immediate excitement for fans still sorting through a messy split with its all-time winningest coach, hiring Daemen's Mike MacDonald may not generate instant buzz. More than anything, it reflects how GM Adrian Wojnarowski believes the program must be run, at least in the near term, to remain competetive in the modern college sports landscape.
On its face, this could be viewed as a hire rooted in familiarity. An ’88 Bona alum, one year behind AD Bob Beretta and three ahead of Wojnarowski. A Western New York lifer. A coach with 36 years of experience and nearly 500 wins, and the only coach in NCAA history with 100-plus wins at the Division I, II, and III levels.
Most recently, MacDonald turned Daemen into a Division II power, going 61–3 over the past two seasons with a .953 winning percentage, second-best nationally over that span. The Wildcats reached No. 1 in the country and advanced to the Elite Eight, with two of the three losses over the past two seasons coming in the NCAA Tournament. He built that run with just five full scholarships, developing a roster that includes two All-Americans who project as Atlantic 10-caliber.
Daemen backed it up against high-level competition. Over the past three seasons, the Wildcats went 10–3 against Top 20 teams and 21–6 against NCAA Tournament teams, including a 5–3 mark in the NCAA Tournament. Over the past two seasons alone, those numbers jumped to 7–1 against Top 20 teams and 18–3 against tournament teams, with a 4–2 NCAA Tournament record.
In reality, every name available to St. Bonaventure this cycle came with drawbacks, and some of the concerns around MacDonald are warranted. This is the decision that follows Mark Schmidt, and with the program at a major crossroads, it clearly defines the direction from here.

Driven as much by necessity in the modern revenue-sharing era as anything else, this won’t be the only hire shaped by this shift across the country. Programs like SBU are making cuts and changes with one goal: putting as much money into players’ pockets as possible.
This won’t only be seen through head coaching hires. Can money be saved by flying commercial or bussing instead of chartering flights? Could the program return to being bought by P5 teams, something it proudly evolved out of under Schmidt but may now need as a revenue source? Even football-rich P5 athletic departments are making broad staff cuts to redirect money toward players, while universities raise tuition to account for the largest paradigm shift in college sports history.
The portal/NIL era has, in many ways, changed the role of the head coach, shifting it from teacher to roster manager and CEO, as constant turnover has pushed a focus on retention and short-term results. That shift has led to the rise of GMs to handle roster building, payments, and personnel, as college basketball’s power structure now mirrors the NBA more than the traditional Division I model.
NBA players have long had the most freedom and leverage of any pro league, with outsized influence due to smaller rosters and a superstar-driven player empowerment era. In just a few years, college basketball has not only matched that leverage but blown past it, now resembling the NBA (if the NBA had annual free agency, no contracts, and no salary cap). For someone like Wojnarowski, who built his career reporting on NBA free agency and roster movement, it’s no surprise to see him dive head first into that model.
With annual roster churn and limited ability to build over multiple years, player quality now drives success more than ever. As Evan Miyakawa put it on The Program, “80% of a team’s success can typically be predicted by how good the roster is. All the remaining stuff, how the games actually go, injuries, player development during the season, refereeing, that all falls in the remaining 20%.
Now, that 20% absolutely matters and could be the difference between whether a team wins a title or doesn’t, but 80% of it comes down to just do you have a good roster or not.”
Bona is leaning into this early, and for better or worse, it won’t go unnoticed. If you take this philosophy to its most extreme form, it becomes a simple thought experiment:
You have a fixed budget to build the best team possible for 2026–27. You can spend all of it on an elite coach and fill the roster with players taking zero NIL, or spend all of it on elite players and have a volunteer coach. Which do you choose?
From there, it becomes adjusting the split between 0 and 100 until you find the right balance between coach and roster, where each dollar is maximized without taking so much from one side that it lowers the ceiling.
MacDonald’s former players, staff, and even media who’ve worked closely with him consistently praise the relationships he builds and the culture he creates. Wojnarowski is making a calculated bet that a veteran coach with a proven track record at a lower cost is worth the tradeoff: trusting experience and fit, with the edge coming from the roster.
At its ceiling, that means turning those savings into players who aren’t just depth pieces, but multiple go-to options who can tilt games at the top of the Atlantic 10, the type Schmidt’s best teams had when they broke through. But the harsh reality is you can no longer pay both Mark Schmidt and the roster he had in 2018 or 2012.
All bets come down to risk and reward, and this one has plenty of both.
It shouldn’t be lost that Schmidt consistently emphasized that even the best coaching only works if you have the talent to execute: “It’s all about the players… I can put guys in situations, but they’ve got to do the job. You’ve never seen a good team with bad players. You need players, and I just try to put them in the right spots to be successful.”
If this doesn’t work, if the roster falls short or the jump from Division II doesn’t translate, there’s little margin for error. The hire, the roster, and the results are all tied together.
Wojnarowski has made the defining move of his tenure as GM just a year and a half in, and it comes with real visibility. However this plays out, it will reflect not just on the coach, but on the strategy. In a sport evolving faster than ever, risks like this are becoming necessary to stay competitive and survive.
Bona has picked a direction. Now it has to make it work.

As for MacDonald, the profile is relatively clear. His teams at Daemen weren’t built on shortcuts or gimmicks. They were structured, detail-oriented, and grounded in habits that will hopefully translate. They valued possessions, defended without fouling, and didn’t beat themselves.
At the core is simplicity and repetition. In an interview with Slappin’ Glass, MacDonald emphasized that “you have to be consistent every day,” and that it starts with “passing and catching… doing the simple things right.” Practices reflect that. They open with passing and catching drills because, in his words, “on the offensive end… that’s the most important thing.” Everything builds from there: footwork, spacing, decision-making. Nothing overly complex, just done correctly and done often. That philosophy reflects his roots in John Beilein’s two-guard framework, where the offense is less about structure and more about execution, built on spacing, shooting, and strong fundamentals.
Offensively, the approach is flexible but intentional. MacDonald isn’t tied to one system as much as he is to putting players in positions where they’re comfortable. His job, as he puts it, is to “figure out what your players do best and put them in position to be successful.” That can mean adjusting actions, spacing, or even who initiates offense. The structure is there, but it bends to personnel.
There’s also a clear emphasis on playing to strengths. “The essence of leadership is aligning strengths so that weaknesses become irrelevant,” he said. That shows up in how his teams operate. Actions are built around what players do well, not forcing them into something they’re not.
Defensively, the principles are straightforward and repeated daily. Three priorities: “don’t give up easy baskets in transition,” “contest everything,” and “no second shots.” Transition defense is a major focus. His teams drill it every day, working to “make it a five-on-five game” and eliminate easy points. Communication is non-negotiable. “You have to talk… you have to use your voice,” and without it, the rest doesn’t work.
There’s also an emphasis on unselfish defense. Players are expected to help, rotate, and trust each other. “Being unselfish defensively is just as important as being unselfish offensively,” he said. It’s less about individual matchups and more about functioning as a unit.
Culturally, the throughline is connection and consistency. The best teams, in his view, are “guys who really care for each other… and are connected.” That isn’t manufactured through one-off events. “Culture is what you do every day… how you act every day,” not something you put on a wall. He wants players who enjoy being in the gym, who “really love basketball,” and who want to be there.
That extends beyond the court. The strongest teams he’s had were groups that genuinely liked being around each other, where players “really enjoyed each other’s success” and weren’t consumed with their own roles. It’s simple, but not easy to replicate.
At the same time, this isn’t a one-to-one translation.
The A-10 is a different animal than the East Region of Division II. Saint Louis will reportedly spend $10 million on its roster. VCU and Dayton will be in the $7 million range, with the next tier above $4 million. The players are older, stronger, and deeper. The margin for error is smaller. The biggest difference, though, is structural. Rosters at this level don’t stay intact long enough to build over multiple years. MacDonald’s strength, as was Mark Schmidt at his peak, has been building programs deliberately, layering pieces and developing continuity. The question now is how that approach adapts to a cycle that often resets every offseason.
MacDonald, who tipped the staff off last year to then-D2 player Cayden Charles, could bring pieces with him. Six-foot-four sharpshooter Zach Philipkoski and 6-8 post presence Benjamin Bill are among the top players at that level. There are several others who could develop as depth pieces.
Regardless of who was hired, there wasn’t going to be instant gratification or an offseason championship. Schmidt himself wasn’t a splash hire when then-AD Steve Watson chose him nearly 20 years ago. There’s some concern that a lukewarm response, combined with how Schmidt’s departure unfolded, could impact an already tight revenue stream, adding urgency to what comes next and how quickly results follow.

This won’t be judged in isolation, but alongside the roster that’s built and how competitive those teams are in a league and sport that have undergone a record-setting shift over the last half decade.
There’s a version where this works. Where the shift in resources pays off, the roster is good enough to compete near the top of the league again, and MacDonald is steady enough to keep Bona relevant year to year through development and retention of key pieces.
There’s also a version where the gap between levels shows, the roster isn’t strong enough to offset it, and the margin disappears quickly.
The most important question probably isn’t MacDonald’s coaching ability or whether he can galvanize a fan base. That comes with winning. The real question is whether player evaluation will be strong enough to maximize every dollar. St. Bonaventure doesn’t have the same margin for error as programs higher up the A-10’s revenue-sharing structure. You can’t commit 20+ percent of your budget to a player and miss. If that happens, the whole thing likely unravels.
That’s what makes this a pivot point, not just for St. Bonaventure, but for programs trying to navigate this version of college basketball.
Bona made a choice. Now it has to make it work. Whether it’s ahead of the curve or a step too soon will be answered in time.